68165c85c8
The WPA3 and Wi-Fi Enhanced Open Deployment and Implementation Guide v1.1 (Tables 4, 5, 6) requires the group-management cipher (BIP) to match the mode and strength of the pairwise cipher: GCM-mode pairwise ciphers pair with BIP-GMAC integrity, CCM-mode pairwise ciphers with BIP-CMAC integrity. The ucode pipeline hard-coded group_mgmt_cipher to AES-128-CMAC (BIP-CMAC-128) regardless of the pairwise cipher, except for the eap192 special case that already forced BIP-GMAC-256. An EHT WPA3-Personal BSS therefore emitted wpa_pairwise=GCMP-256 alongside group_mgmt_cipher=AES-128-CMAC -- the integrity cipher two steps weaker than the data cipher and a spec violation on EHT. hostapd has a single group_mgmt_cipher knob, so the selected BIP has to be compatible with every pairwise cipher in wpa_pairwise. Picking from the first token would mis-select on mixed lists -- e.g. wpa_pairwise=\"GCMP-256 CCMP\" would yield BIP-GMAC-256, which a CCMP-only STA cannot negotiate. Walk the wpa_pairwise tokens and pick the BIP that matches the weakest cipher present: CCMP / TKIP -> AES-128-CMAC (BIP-CMAC-128) CCMP-256 -> BIP-CMAC-256 GCMP -> BIP-GMAC-128 GCMP-256 -> BIP-GMAC-256 Token matching uses fnmatch wildcards against a copy of wpa_pairwise that is padded with leading and trailing spaces, so each token is space-bounded regardless of its position in the list. The RSN override pairwise lists are not consulted: in the only caller that sets them (WPA3-Personal Compatibility Mode), Tables 6 and 7 require BIP-CMAC-128 across RSNE/RSNOE/RSNO2E even when the override lists advertise GCMP-256, so wpa_pairwise=CCMP already yields the correct BIP. An explicit ieee80211w_mgmt_cipher UCI value still wins over the derived default. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com> Link: https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/pull/23009 Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de> |
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